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Brown: Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.: Evaluating the Sourc

NOTE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS V. MCORP
FINANCIAL, INC.: EVALUATING THE
SOURCE-OF-STRENGTH DOCTRINE
INTRODUCION

The Supreme Court of the United States in Board of Governors
v. MCorp Financial, Inc.' effectively reinstated the Federal Reserve
Board's controversial "Source-of-Strength" doctrine by reversing the
Fifth Circuit which had struck down the doctrine one year earlier.2
Although seldom litigated, the Source-of-Strength doctrine posed significant problems for managers of a bank holding company ("BHC")
who were, after 1987, required to recapitalize ailing subsidiaries with
parent corporation funds. Moreover, the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19893 and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 19914 both contain provisions increasing the BHC's responsibility for reviving an ailing subsidiary, as well as providing partial funding of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") liquidations.
Part I of this Note will discuss the Source-of-Strength doctrine,
describing its history and current status. Part II will analyze the
MCorp decision, and Part III will discuss the necessity of the Sourceof-Strength doctrine in light of recently enacted legislation, the doctrine of corporate separateness, and the failure of regulatory oversight.

1. 112 S. CL 459 (1991).
2. MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
112 S. CL 459 (1991). The Source-of-Strength doctrine requires "bank holding companies to
guarantee the adequacy of the capital of their banldng subsidiaries and allows the federal
regulators to seize assets from the holding company to enforce this guarantee." Kieran L
Fallon, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the "Source-of-Strength"
Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 1344, 1349 (1991).
3. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 187 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 StaL 2253 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
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This Note will conclude that the Source-of-Strength doctrine is unnecessary beyond its original incarnation as a requirement of BHC
formation and expansion.
L THE SOURCE-OF-STRENGTH DoCrmNE
The Source-of-Strength doctrine is a Federal Reserve Board
("FRB"), self-proclaimed requirement that a BHC guarantee the capital adequacy of its subsidiaries.' Initially, the doctrine was employed
in the BHC application process6 but was later expanded to include
capital infusions into subsidiaries when deemed necessary by the
7

FRB.

A.

Bank Holding Companies

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA') defines a
BHC as "any company which has control over any bank or over any
company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of
this chapter."' Traditionally, the BHC structure was used to avoid
restrictive branching and interstate expansion regulations.9 Congress'

5. Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee on The Federal Reserve
Board's "Source-of-Strength" Policy, May 18, 1987 [hereinafter SFRC Statement]. The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee is composed of economists, academics, and former
regulators who act as "watchdogs" over federal banking and securities regulators. See also
Fallon, supra note 2, at 1371; Fed May Lack Authority to Require BHCs to Aid Bank
Subsidiaries, Critics Warn, 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 923 (May 25, 1987) [hereinafter Fed
May Lack Authority].
6. See infra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
8. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1988). The Federal

Reserve defined "control" as
(i) Ownership, control, or power to vote 25 percent or more of the outstanding
shares of any class of voting securities of the bank or other company, directly or
indirectly or acting through one or more other persons;
(ii) Control in any manner over the election of a majority of the directors, trustees,
or general partners (or individuals exercising similar functions) of the bank or other
company;
(ii)
The power to exercise, directly or indirectly, a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the bank or other company, as determined by the Board
after notice and opportunity for hearing ... ; or
(iv) Conditioning in any manner the transfer of 25 percent or more of the outstanding shares of any class of voting securities of a bank or other company upon
the transfer of 25 percent or more of the outstanding shares of any class of voting
securities of another bank or other company.
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(e)(1) (1992).
9. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MLLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULAION 293-96 (1992) (discussing the bases of BHC regulation).
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enactment of the BHCA acknowledged two primary problems with
BHCs: (1) the danger of concentration of commercial banking resources through unit acquisitions, and (2) the combination, under a
single corporate entity, of banking and non-banking enterprises.' 0
The BHC structure is particularly attractive in states such as Texas
which prohibit branching."'
The BHC structure is much like the standard holding company,12 except the BHC's bank ownership justifies regulation. Unlike
non-banking holding companies, significant social costs result from
BHC failures, especially depletion of federal deposit insurance
William R. Keeton, a senior economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, argues that BHCs adversely affect their subsidiary banks' safety and soundness in three fundamental ways. First, a
BHC's benefits from diversification are inferior to those achieved by
unrestricted branching because the presence of limited liability gives
the parent an incentive to allow a subsidiary to fail. This occurs because the FDIC will insure the subsidiary's losses while the parent
appears financially sound.14 Second, the BHC structure encourages a
parent company to engage in improper transactions with its affiliates.
While successful transactions promise high profits, failures pose little
threat of loss because the FDIC will insure the losses if the bank
fails."5 Improper transactions may take the form of below-market
loans to bank officers or subsidiaries, mispriced business deals, or
book value purchases of non-performing assets. 6 Finally, the BHC

10. S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5519, 5520.; see also MACEY & MilLER, supra note 9, at 293-95 (noting inter alia that
additional reasons for regulating BHCs include compromise of subsidiary bank integrity
through improper transactions and financial favoritism regarding loans).
11. William RL Keeton, Bank Holding Companies, Cross-Rank Guarantees, and Source
of Strength, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY EcoN. REV., May/June 1990, at 54, 55.
12. Keeton defined a holding company as a company "that owns or controls other
companies and operates those companies as separately incorporated subsidiaries. An important
feature of all holding companies is that they enjoy limited liability against the claims of
private creditors on their subsidiaries." Id at 55.
13. Id
14. See id at 56. The BHC will have a strong incentive to allow its subsidiary to fail,
even though it will lose its investment in the subsidiary in situations where the subsidiary
has experienced heavy losses and is unlikely to return to profitability. In this case the BHC
has the advantage of being able to shift its loss onto the FDIC in exchange for foregoing
unlikely future profits. l
15. See id at 56-57.
16. See id (discussing improper transactions and regulatory controls on same, and also
noting that an important drawback relates to the likelihood of civil or criminal enforcement
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structure encourages undercapitalization of the parent company.' 7 The
BHC's incentive to engage in risky transactions may result in high leveraging of the patent, thus encouraging the parent to engage in further high-risk activities in order to recover previous losses or to pay
down debt. Once again, if the transactions are unsuccessful and the
bank fails, federal deposit insurance will cover the losses."8
Various solutions have been proposed in response to these issues. 9 One of the most controversial solutions in current practice is
the FRB's Source-of-Strength doctrine.
B. Bases of the Source-of-Strength Doctrine
1. The Bank Holding Company Act
The Source-of-Strength doctrine was first used in the context of
applications for BHC formation and expansion." Formation of BHCs
is governed by section 3 of the BHCA under which the potential
BHC must receive FRB permission. 2 Expansion of BHCs is also
governed by section 3. BHCs desiring to acquire additional units must
also apply for FRB permission which is dependent upon an FRB
determination that the acquisition or merger would not result in a

after the damage has been done). Keeton also observes that similar incentives exist for BHC
transactions with their non-bank affiliates and that §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act do not necessarily provide full coverage in this area. See also STAFF OF HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE OF THE
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., MCORP: A

REGULATORY CASE STUDY 18 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter MCoP.P STUDY] (discussing
below-market loans made by MCorp to certain insiders which allowed the borrowers to pay a
6% interest rate while being able to reinvest the funds in risk-free government securities at
over 8.5%; the FRB allowed MCorp to implement this program despite its emerging financial
instability).
17. Keeton, supra note 11, at 57.
18. Although the FDIC may be forced to bail out a BHC's subsidiary, the entire
organization does not necessarily fail. Id. See generally MCoRP STUDY, supra note 16
(discussing the federal bailout of MCorp).
19. Keeton suggests reduction of deposit insurance and permission to branch freely in
addition to the Source-of-Strength doctrine and Cross-Bank Guarantees discussed. Keeton,
supra note 11, at 57-58; see also MACEY & MIER, supra note 9, at 264-88 (discussing
policy issues in deposit insurance and suggestions for risk reduction).
20. See James F. Groth, Comment, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding Companies to
Bail Out Their Failing Subsidiaries?-An Analysis of the Federal Reserve Board's Source-ofStrength Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 112, 114 n.14 (1991) (providing examples of early
use of the doctrine); see also Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 FED. RES. BULL 1261 (1964)
(denying application for BHC formation under § 3(a)(1) of the BHCA).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1988) (stating that '[i]t shall be unlawful, except with the
prior approval of the Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to
become a bank holding company-).
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monopoly, and would not substantially lessen competition. 22 In all
cases, the FRB will look to "the financial and managerial resources
and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."' Further, the FRB will take into consideration ease of regulatory supervision and the presence of certain bank stock loans. 24
The FRB may reject a BHC's application solely on the basis of its
findings relating to the BHC's financial and managerial resources.'
Expansion into non-banking activities is generally governed by the
exceptions to section 4(a). 2 6
The Source-of-Strength doctrine emerged from this statutory
framework, specifically based upon section 3's language empowering
the FRB to consider the applicant's financial and managerial resources
as well as its future prospects.27
2. The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
The FRB's cease and desist authority under the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 ("FISA) 28 has been argued to be a
source of statutory authority for the Source-of-Strength doctrine as
well. 29 Section 1818(b)(1) allows an
appropriate Federal banking agency [which is of the opinion that]

22. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1) (Supp. I1 1991). However, an acquisition, consolidation or
merger may be approved notwithstanding anticompetitive effects where the FRB finds that
"the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.- IM § 1842(c)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 1842(c)(2); see also if/§ 1842(c)(5) (stating that "[c]onsideration of the
managerial resources of a company or bank.. . shall include consideration of the competence, experience and integrity of the officers, directors, and principal shareholders of the
company or bank").
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2). The FRB may condition approval on the BHC's "adequate
assurances" that it will provide appropriate information to aid the FRB in enforcement. See
id § 1842(c)(3)(A). The BHC must first submit its application to its "local Federal Reserve
bank,... after the local Federal Reserve bank has reviewed the application and made
recommendations, it forwards the application to the Board for a final determinatiom" Fallon,
supra note 2, at 1353 n.49 (describing the application and approval process).
25. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1353 n.54. Fallon further notes that § 210 of the
FDICIA provides similarly.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a); see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 1354.
27. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c); Clayton Bancshares Corp., 50 FED. REs. BULL
1261 (denying application because of financial and managerial deficiencies).
28. Pub. L No. 89-695, 80 StaL 1028 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
29. See generally Groth, supra note 20, at 126.
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any insured depository institution.., or any institution-affiliated
party is engaging or has engaged, or the agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the depository institution is about to engage, in
an unsafe or unsound practice [to issue a cease and desist order or

an order to take affimative action].3
Further, § 1818(b)(3) provides that the FRB's cease and desist authority applies to BHCs.3
FISA has been justified as statutory authority for the Source-ofStrength doctrine under the common law and its legislative history
arguing that the "unsafe or unsound" provisions were intended as a
broad delegation of authority in deference to the FRB's regulatory
expertise.32 Moreover, in 1984 the Supreme Court held in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 3 that "if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." 34 The agency's interpretation

is reviewed
on an arbitrary, capricious, or contrary-to-the-statute stan35
dard.
However, as Groth notes, using this language to require a BHC
to recapitalize an ailing subsidiary under the rubric of "unsafe or
unsound practices" through capital infusions is not necessarily an

optimal policy choice. For example, Groth argues that a recapitalization using BHC funds is complicated by the many interests affected.' Groth further argues that on balance, the risks inherent in recapitalization, as is typical of banking regulation in general, may be
deemed to be assumed by the relevant parties because of the perva-

30. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (emphasis supplied).
31. Id § 1818(b)(3).
32. See Groth, supra note 20, at 126-32 (justifying FISA as a source of statutory
authority for the Source-of-Strength doctrine). Groth includes numerous cases supporting FISA
as statutory authority for banldng regulators' broad-based interpretive authority. See, e.g.,
Croos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that "[t]he phrase 'unsafe or unsound banking practice' is widely used in the regulatory
statutes and in case law, and one of the purposes of the banking acts is clearly to commit
the progressive definition and eradication of scch practices to the expertise of the appropriate
regulatory agencies").
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. Id at 843.
35. Id at 844; see also Groth, supra note 20, at 129 (discussing the observation in
Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1987), that "Congress intended
to delegate a substantial degree of authority to the agency by the use of [the language in §
16r1(b)(e)],).
36. Groth, supra note 20, at 127.
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sive nature of banking regulation. 7 However, this argument fails to
account for situations where capital infusions would do more harm
than good, such as where the entire organization would be financially
damaged by the order.
3. The Early Cases
The FRB's first use of the term "Source-of-Strength" occurred in
First Southwest Bancorporation." In .First Southwest, the FRB denied a Texas BHC's application to acquire four banks because of the
holding company's questionable managerial practices which the FRB
determined were likely to harm the subsidiaries and minority shareholders. The FRB, in rejecting the application, stated that "a holding
company should be a source of financial and managerial strength for
the banks in its systems rather than vice versa."39
The FRB elaborated on this theme in Downs Bancshares, Inc..'
in which it denied Downs's application for approval of its formation
of a BHC, which would also operate a general insurance agency,
because of capital deficiencies which would result in the BHC's inability to meet unexpected contingent needs.41 In considering
Downs's application, the FRB first noted that "consummation of the
proposal would not eliminate significant existing or potential competition, increase the concentration of banking resources, or have an
2 Howadverse effect on other banks in the relevant market ....
ever, after closer examination, the FRB decided to reject the application, stating that even though the principals had provided personal
guarantees to amortize the debt incurred by the transaction, "the debt
retirement program does not provide [Downs] with the necessary financial flexibility to service the acquisition of debt while maintaining
Bank's capital at an acceptable level."43 The FRB finally determined

37. Id at 130. Risks of recapitalization may involve slowed BHC growth, discouragement of BHC diversification or adverse financial impact on the BHC itself. Keeton, supra
note 11, at 62; see also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (observing that the
banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated).
38. 58 FED. RES. BULL 301 (1972).

39. Id at 302; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1365 n.134 (discussing First Southwest and the
FRB's reasons for denying the company's application); see also 1 HARVEY L. PrIT ET AT-,
TBE LAW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 40.1 (1992) (citing cases discussing BHCs' need to serve
as sources of strength to its subsidiaries).
40. 61 FED. REs. BULL. 673 (1975).
41.

Id at 674.

42. Id
43. id
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that "the financial requirements ... [of the transaction] could prevent
it from resolving any unforeseen problems that may arise at Bank and
thereby impair Bank's ability to continue to serve the community as a
viable banking organization."" Not only was capital flexibility a
requirement, but the FRB would presumably require a showing that
such capital flexibility would be used in the event of subsidiary
45
need.
The FRB's rejection of an application in Seilon, Inc. 46 to ac-

quire a Nevada BHC provides insight into the FRB's analysis of
managerial considerations. Seilon sought to purchase a controlling
interest in the First Bancorporation of Reno, Nevada, then the fourth
largest of Nevada's eight commercial banks.47 Although the FRB
initially determined that the transaction would have no anticompetitive
or anticonvenience effects, rejection was based upon both financial
and managerial deficiencies. 4' The FRB noted that Seilon's nonbanking activities were operating at a loss. Acquisition of the bank
would be the only way that Seilon could expect to show a profit;
thus, showing that Seilon would not only fail to be a "Source-ofStrength" to its subsidiary, but it would also have significant incentive
to "endeavor to improve its financial condition at the expense of
Bank through liberal or excessive dividends or management fees
drawn from Bank. " 50 The Seilon decision also focused upon managerial deficiencies. The FRB noted that the bank would be subject to
absentee management. 5 In addition, no member of the board had
any in-depth banking experience. 2 Thus, Seilon's application was
denied.
However, the FRB will approve an application where the applicant commits to an acceptable capital improvement program. Northern
States Financial Corp.53 involved the formation of a BHC through
the acquisition of the City National Bank of Detroit, Michigan. At the

44. Id
45. See, &g., Seilon, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 729 (1972) (stating that "It]he Board has
previously stressed the importance of financial strength of a [BHC] so that it can assist its
subsidiaries with capital if the need arises").
46. Id
47. d
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id at 729-30.
51. Id Only one of Scilon's five directors was a Nevada resident.
52. Id
53. 58 FED. RES. BULL 827 (1972).
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time, City National had $529 million in deposits and operated thirty
offices in the greater Detroit area.' Although the FRB could not
find any anticompetitive tendencies, it noted that Northern States,
being a newly formed entity, would have to rely upon its potential
bank subsidiary for its financial and managerial soundness." The
FRB observed that while the banks had satisfactory finances, as banking subsidiaries, their capital positions required improvement.56 Thus,
approval of the applications was based upon a $25 million capital improvement program directed at strengthening the bank and at enhancing its prospects."
Generally, the banking community accepted this form of the
Source-of-Strength doctrine5 8 However, Board of Governors v. First
Lincolnwood Corp., 9 an unsuccessful challenge to the doctrine, provided further confirmation of the validity of the doctrine at the BHC
application level.
4. The First Lincolnwood Decision
In First Lincolnwood, the majority stockholders of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood organized a holding company (First
Lincolnwood Corp.) with the intention of exchanging their bank stock
for holding company stock.60 In addition, the BHC would assume
$3.7 million in debt the stockholders incurred in acquiring control of
the bank.6 The dividends that the BHC received on the bank's stock
would be used to amortize the debt over a twelve-year period.62 Finally, the arrangement would have allowed the bank and the BHC to
file consolidated tax returns, thus providing a significant tax benefit.

63

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 828.
Id
Id
Id
Fallon, supra note 2, at 1366 & n.136.
439 U.S. 234 (1978).
Id at 237.
Id Pursuant to the transaction, the stockholders would remain secondarily liable

under the $3.7 million obligation. Id at 237 n.3.
62. Id at 238.
63. Id Allowing the group to file a consolidated tax return would allow it to deduct
debt service interest from the bank's gross income. The tax benefit could then be transferred
to the BHC as a tax-free intercorporate dividend, which could subsequently be used to retire
the debt incurred through the acquisition. Id at 238 n.4; see also Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 26 U.S.C. § 1501 (1958) (allowing an affiliated group of corporations to file consoli-

dated tax returns).
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The initial proposal was approved by the local Federal Reserve
Bank on the strength of the bank's future prospects and strong management However, the Comptroller of the Currency, upon independent review determined that the application should be denied because
the bank's capital position was "inadequate," and was unlikely to
improve under the proposal.6' A modified plan was submitted and
was approved by both the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and the
Comptroller, but was rejected by the FRB staff after a determination
that material capital improvement was necessary. 65
The Seventh Circuit, upon rehearing, set aside the FRB's order
holding that section 3(c) of the BHCA justified denial of an application based on the Source-of-Strength doctrine only where the deficiencies were "caused or enhanced by the proposed transaction," which
was a mere reshuffling of ownership interests in the organization.'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FRB's interpretation of section 3(c) was supported by both the language of the statute
and Congressional intent. Initially, the Court stated that section 3(c)
required the FRB to evaluate a BHC's financial and managerial
soundness "in every case, not just in cases in which the Board finds
that the transaction will have an anticompetitive effect."67 Second, in
examining legislative intent and subsequent amendments to the
BHCA, the Court determined that there was no ambiguity concerning
the weight which may be attached to financial and managerial factors
in connection with language borrowed from the Bank Merger Act. 68
Third, the Court noted that upholding the doctrine was supported by
the principle of great deference to an agency's long-standing interpretation of its statutory mandate, "especially when Congress has refused
to alter the administrative construction." 6 Finally, the Court held
64. Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 239 (1978). The
Court defined "capital position" as "the ratio of equity capital to total liabilities less cash on
hand, known as the invested-asset ratio." Id at 239 n.6.
65. Id at 240-41. The FRB further found that "even if the bank's optimistic earnings

projections were realized, respondent would lack the financial flexibility necessary both to
service its debt and to maintain adequate capital at the bank.- Id
66. Id at 242.
67. Id at 243.
68. Id at 245 nll. The Court stated that even though there may have been some
ambiguity, it was resolved in favor of the Source-of-Strength doctrine by Senator Robertson,

Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency committee, who stated that "if there are no
substantial anticompetitive effects and no tendency to create a monopoly and no suggestion of
restraint of trade, the banking agency will proceed to consider the merger on the basis of the
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions and the convenience and needs of the community to be served." Id
69. Id at 248. The Court also stated that "Congress has been made aware of this
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that the doctrine was not limited to situations where the unsoundness
would be either caused or exacerbated by the transaction. 0 In addition to finding no intent to so limit the doctrine, the Court relied
once again on its deference to agency interpretations.7" The Supreme
Court, by validating the Source-of-Strength doctrine and refusing to
limit it to merely unsatisfactory transactions, set the stage for the
evolution of the doctrine into its present form as an all-purpose enforcement weapon.
5. Regulation Y and the 1987 Policy Statement
In 1984, the FRB promulgated section 225.4(a)(1) providing that
"[a] bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and
managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not contuct [sic]
its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner."' The new regulation was promulgated without explanatory remarks. Industry analysts
simply assumed that the regulation was a mere codification of the
original Source-of-Strength policy.73
It soon became apparent that the FRB intended to expand the
Source-of-Strength doctrine rather than to merely codify it.74 In
1987, the FRB attempted to use the Source-of-Strength doctrine to
force Iowa's Hawkeye Bancorp to recapitalize a failing subsidiary
after a debt restructuring; however, the FRB abandoned the charges.7" The FRB took the position that the parent's failure to serve as
a Source-of-Strength was an unsafe and unsound practice.76 Although
the BHC refused to comply with the order, state banking authorities
closed the subsidiary and the FRB withdrew its charges.'
In response to the Hawkeye Bancorp case, the FRB released a
policy statement in 1987 clearly indicating the FRB's intent to hold

practice, yet four times has revisited the Act and left the practice untouched." Id
70. Id at 249.
71. Id at 251.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1992). Section 225.4(a)(1) was promulgated as part of the
FRB's comprehensive 1984 revisions to Regulation Y. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1368.
73. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1368 n.159.
74. See id at 1369.
75. Id According to Fallon, the FRB dropped the Source-of-Strength charges because
enforcement would have caused Hawkeye to violate its debt restructuring agreemenL Id
76. Ic The FRB ordered Hawkeye to provide the subsidiary with $1.2 million in new

capital. Id
77. Id Fallon further noted that commentators had stated that the reason the FRB
dropped the charges was because it had failed to compile a sufficient record of inadequate
capitalization. Id at 1369-70 n.167.
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BHCs financially and managerially responsible for their ailing subsidiaries. 7 The FRB policy statement ("Policy Statement") opens by
reiterating its "long-standing principle" that "bank holding companies
should serve as sources of financial and managerial strength to their
subsidiary banks."7 9 However, the Policy Statement departs from the
original version of the Source-of-Strength doctrine by confirming what
was implied in the Hawkeye Bancorp matter; that
a bank holding company should stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds to its subsidiary banks
during periods of financial stress or adversity and should maintain
the financial flexibility and capital-raising capacity to obtain additional resources for assisting its subsidiary banks in a manner consistent with the provisions of this policy statement."
Next, the Policy Statement asserts prior approval of the doctrine
through "frequent pronouncements," section 225.4(a)(1) of Regulation
Y, and the First Lincolnwood decision. The Policy Statement also
provides that the doctrine is justified through the benefits that BHCs
derive at the corporate level from their ability to access Federal Reserve credit and to take in deposits that are federally insured."1 Also,
the FRB stated that the doctrine was further justified by BHCs' "critical fiduciary responsibilities of depository institutions as custodians of
depositors' funds and their strategic role within our economy as operators of the payments system and impartial providers of credit." 2
Failure to provide financial support for ailing subsidiaries, according to the FRB, would "be viewed as an unsafe and unsound
banldng practice or a violation of Regulation Y or both... [enforceable by] issuance of a cease-and-desist order or other enforcement
action." 3 However, the FRB also acknowledged that "there may be

78. See Policy Statement on the Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as
Sources of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987), reprinted in Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 43,055A, at 22,058 [hereinafter Policy Statement]. The Policy
Statement fails to indicate whether a BHC would be held solely responsible for recapitalizing
a subsidiary, especially where the BHC does not own all of the subsidiary's stock. The
Policy Statement does indicate that exceptions are possible in unusual and limited circumstances. However, presumably, the recapitalization remedy would only be imposed on a party
which was in control of the subsidiary in accordance with the FRB's definition of control at
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(e)(1) (1992).
79. Policy Statement, supra note 78, at 22,058.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
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unusual and limited circumstances where flexible application of the
[doctrine] might be necessary ... [and may justify exceptions]." 4
Fallon identifies three problematic issues raised by the Policy
Statement. First, the Policy Statement fails to specify either the
amount a BHC might be required to transfer to its subsidiary, or the
method for calculating the amount.8 5 Second, the Policy Statement
provides no definition of a failure to support that would constitute a
violation. 6 Finally, no assurance was given that BHCs which would
be unable to provide funding would be exempted from the doctrine." Moreover, the new Source-of-Strength doctrine was widely
criticized. by government agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the FDIC, as well as private organizations
such as the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee." Thus, armed
with its newly enhanced Source-of-Strength doctrine, the FRB was
prepared for its first major challenge to the expanded doctrine, MCorp
Financial,Inc. v. Board of Governors.9
I.

THE MCoRP DECISION
A.

The Facts

MCorp Financial was formed in 1984 as a result of the merger
of the Mercantile Texas Corporation of Dallas and Southwest
Bancshares of Houston." By 1986, with twenty-five subsidiaries and
over $20 billion in assets, MCorp had become the largest Texas BHC
and was ranked in the top twenty-five BHCs nationwide. 91 However,
during this two-year period of growth, MCorp amassed an unsafe
portfolio of classified assets and net operating losses which were

84. Id It is unclear, however, what situations would justify an exception to the doctrine.
85. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1371.
86. Id

87. Id
88. See id (observing that the problems associated with the Policy Statement caused
"quick and vociferous opposition"); see also Basis for Fed's "Source-of-Strength" Policy is
Questionable, Breeden Says, 49 Banking Rep. (BNA) 541 (Sept. 28, 1987) (noting that the
doctrine could. force BHC directors to breach fiduciary duties to shareholders to avoid
regulatory consequences; adversely affect BHC debt ratings; and contradict business judgment
rule principles dictating that the decision to prop up an ailing subsidiary rests with the
discretion of the company's management); William M. Isaac, Conflicts in the Fed's 'Source
of Strength' Doctrine, AM. BANKER, Dec. 28, 1988, at 4; SFRC Statement, supra note 5
(noting problems with the Source-of-Strength Doctrine).
89. 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. CL 459 (1991).
90. See MCORP STUDY, supra note 16, at 5.
91. Id
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discovered by both the FRB and the Comptroller of the Currency in
their periodic examinations. Despite this, no intervention occurred.9
Although these problems were noted in examination reports, MCorp
and its subsidiaries "consistently ignored [recommendations and informal memoranda of understanding], internal controls were materially
deficient, dividends were paid despite substantial losses, and formal
enforcement actions were not initiated by either the FRB or the
OCC."93 Eventually, primary capital had become so depleted that
federal regulators were forced to declare twenty of the twenty-five
subsidiary banks insolvent. The cost of the failure is estimated to be
over $2.7 billion. 94
B.

The Fifth Circuit Opinion

In October of 1988, prior to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency's ("OCC") appointment of the FDIC as receiver of twenty
of MCorp's banking subsidiaries, the FRB had issued an Amended
Notice of Charges alleging unsafe and unsound practices and ordering
implementation of "an acceptable capital plan that would ensure that
all of MCorp's available assets are used to recapitalize the [subsidiaries]."9 5 Five months later, in March of 1989, a group of MCorp's
creditors commenced an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding in the
Southern District of New York.96 After the OCC appointed the
FDIC as receiver, MCorp and two of its subsidiaries voluntarily filed
a Chapter 11 petition in the Southern District of TexasY Shortly
thereafter, both proceedings were consolidated in the Southern District
of Texas.98 The FRB appealed the district court's preliminary injunction staying further prosecution of both the Source-of-Strength and
section 23A 99 administrative proceedings. Bankruptcy court approval

92. Id The MCORP STUDY defines "Classified Assets" as 'assets which have been
designated as either substandard, doubtful or loss. They are typically loans which the bank
has reason to believe will not be repaid in fulL" Id at 5 n.1.
93. Id at 5. Further, even though MCorp was financially distressed, an "executive loan"
program was instituted which would provide selected senior managers with below-market
loans which were easily invested in federally insured certificates of deposit for arbitrage
profits. The executive loan program was estimated to have added $8.5 million to the bailout's
cost. Id at 18, 20.
94. Id at 6. The MCorp failure is the third largest bank failure in United States history.
95. MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1990).
96. Id at 853.
97. Id at 854.
98. Id
99. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988). Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act restricts certain
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of any further proceedings was also required."°
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the FRB's contention that
§ 1818(i) of the FISA granted the FRB exclusive jurisdiction over its
own administrative proceedings. However, the court also stated that in
accordance with Leedom v. Kyne,1 ' if an agency's actions exceeded
its statutory authority, § 1818(i) would not prevent judicial review
prior to a final decision by the agency."° The section 23A proceeding was found to be within the FRB's statutory authority.
However, the court then held that the FRB's use of the
enhanced Source-of-Strength doctrine exceeded its statutory authority
under §§ 1818(b)(1) and (3) of the BHCA to regulate unsafe or unsound practices. 3 In striking down the doctrine, the court first acknowledged that although First Lincolnwood gave the FRB the authority to evaluate financial and managerial soundness in the context
of formation and expansion applications, it did not provide this authority beyond that context. 4 Second, in addressing the FRB's assertion of authority under PISA, C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) and its Policy
Statement, the court observed that although agencies' interpretations of
unclear statutory matters should be afforded deference, "the courts
interpretation... if it is 'unreasonable'
may invalidate the agency's
05
or 'impermissible."
In finding the FRB's interpretation of the BHCA impermissible,
the court determined that the Congressional definition of "unsafe or
unsound" practices"os did not entail requiring an infusion of funds
which would clearly violate not only principles of corporate separateBHC corporate practices, "including restrictions on transactions between subsidiary banks and
nonbank affiliates." Board of Governors v. MCorp Fimancial, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 459, 461 n.2
(1991).
100. Board of Governors, 112 S. Ct. at 461.
101. 358 U.S. 184 (1958). In Leedom, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Whittaker, allowed judicial review of a National Labor Relations Board proceeding which,
like the instant proceeding, was expressly precluded from judicial review by statute. The
Court held that where an agency has exceeded its statutory authority, the courts may intervene to "strike down" the order. Id at 188.
102. See MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 857-58 (5th Cir.
1990).
103. Id at 863.
104. Id at 861.
105. Id. at 862.
106. The court stated that the authoritative definition of "unsafe or unsound" practices
"embraces any action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of
prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk
or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds." Id. at 863.
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ness, but also standards of prudent operations and fiduciary duties to
shareholders."° Moreover, Congress consistently failed to include
any Source-of-Strength doctrine in any of its revisions of the BHCA.
Further, Congress specifically defined limitations "on transactions
considered unsound between subsidiary banks and holding companies," without providing for capital infusions. 0 8 Thus, the doctrine
appeared to have been invalidated.
C.

The Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme Court's reversal of the Fifth Circuit effectively
reinstated the Source-of-Strength doctrine without rendering an opinion as to its validity."° First, the Court reaffirmed that both administrative proceedings were squarely within the ambit of the § 1818(i)
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay propreclusion.'
not
apply because the proceedings fell within the "govdid
vision"'
ernmental unit's police or regulatory power" exemption. 2 Finally,
Justice Stevens distinguished Leedom v. Kyne"' on two grounds.
First, unlike Leedom, the FRB proceeding provided a framework for
subsequent review of its findings. Second, the preclusive language in
the FISA was expressly stated, whereas, in Leedom, the preclusion
was only implied." 4 In light of the FISA's clear statutory preclusion, the judiciary was thus precluded from reviewing FRB administrative proceedings unless the respondent would be otherwise deprived
of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the decision." 5 Thus, since
jurisdiction was lacking, the Court declined to proceed to the merits
of the Source-of-Strength doctrine.

107. Id
108. Id Also, the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee stated that Congress failed to
permit regulators to issue demands such as those associated with the Source-of-Strength
doctrine to BHCs, while specifically allowing the same to occur with "institutions in their
charge.- Id
109. Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 459, 466 (1991).
110. Id at 463.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
112. Board of Governors, 112 S. CL at 464; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
113. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
114. Board of Governors, 112 S. CL at 466.
115. Id at 464; see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 1378.
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III. EVALUATING THE SOURCE-OF-STRENGTH DOCTRINE
A.

Justificationsfor the Doctrine

Several justifications are posed in support of the doctrine. First is
the doctrine's ability to combat moral hazard problems inherent in
federal deposit insurance.11 6 According to Groth, federal deposit insurance results in moral hazard problems both from management and
depositor viewpoints because federal deposit insurance allows bank
managers incentives to incur greater risks with depositors' funds. The
same insurance gives the depositor no incentive to inquire into the
financial health of his bank." 7 The moral hazard issue is linked to
the Source-of-Strength doctrine in situations where a bank subsidiary
becomes financially weak. In those situations, the BHC's management
has increased incentives to engage in high-risk transactions hoping
that success will improve the subsidiary's position, and knowing that
federal deposit insurance will cover the downside risk."' Arguably,
the Source-of-Strength doctrine may counteract this problem by holding BHCs responsible for the results of the failed transactions. However, the moral hazard problem may be combatted in other, more
direct ways, such as risk-adjusted insurance premiums, or prohibitions
on certain transactions for banks with inferior CAMEL ratings. 9 In
*fact, as of November 14, 1991, the Comptroller links CAMEL ratings
to decisions to commence enforcement proceedings.'
A second justification is that the doctrine will prevent BHCs
from engaging in improper transfers of funds between subsidiaries.'
In this situation, transfers in violation of the principles of
corporate separateness justify disregard of the corporate form, and
thus, the doctrine may be useful here.
A final justification of the doctrine posits that the possibility of

116. Moral hazard is a problem encountered when an insurance plan results in the
insured having either no incentive to avoid risk, or the incentive to affirmatively seek out
risk WILUAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BuNDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 550
(3d ed. 1985).
117. See Groth, supra note 20, at 137. Moreover, banks' federal deposit insurance
premiums do not depend on investment risk levels, thus contributing to managers' incentives
to incur particularly unsafe risks.
118. Id at 138.
119. The CAMEL rating system evaluates banks based upon capital adequacy, asset
quality, management effectiveness, earnings quality, and liquidity. MCORP STUDY, supra note
16, at 21.
120. Id at 21.
121. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1383.
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capital infusion orders give BHCs incentives to maintain proper capitalization at its subsidiaries." However, as discussed in the section
below on corporate separateness, BHCs have every incentive to properly maintain adequate capital reserves at their subsidiaries.
B. Statutory Alternatives
1. Cross-Bank Guarantees
The FDIC's cross-guarantee provision provides undercapitalized
bank subsidiaries with a congressionally-supported alternative to the
Source-of-Strength doctrine. Section 206 of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") provides that:
[a]ny insured depository institution shall be liable for any loss incurred by the [FDIC] ... in connection with (i) the default of a
commonly controlled insured depository institution; or (ii) any assistance provided by the [FDIC] to any commonly controlled insured
depository institution in danger of default."z Further, the cross-guarantee provisions provide for discretionary waiver of assessments "if
exemption is in the best interests of
the [FDIC] determines that such
12 4
the Bank Insurance Fund ....
The cross-guarantee provisions were submitted in response to
cases such as MCorp, in which a number of subsidiaries would become insolvent while others retained profitability."z The problem
arose, of course, where the BHC would2 6not call upon its profitable
subsidiaries to support the troubled ones.
In requiring the healthy banks to support the ailing ones, the
FDIC resolves the problem of inferior benefits of geographic diversification. 7 Given cross-guarantees, BHCs would be forced to utilize
the risk-spreading benefits of geographic diversity rather than to merely allow subsidiaries to fail automatically. 121 Therefore, a BHC
would at least have to make a prudent attempt to restore the financial

122. Id.
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 1I 1991). The provision defines "commonlycontrolled" as institutions "which are controlled by the same depository institution holding
I& § 1815(e)(9)(A). Therefore, BHCs' subsidiaries are governed by this secompany ....
tion.
124. IR § 1815(e)(5)(A).
125. See Keeton, supra note 11, at 58.
126. Id
127. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Keeten, supra note 11, at 58-59.
128. See Keeton, supra note 11, at 59.
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stability of its subsidiaries where it is feasible. 29 Cross-guarantees
also promote safe banking by removing the incentive for a BHC to
strip its failing subsidiaries of assets for the benefit of more profitable
subsidiaries."s
Keeton points out several drawbacks to the cross-guarantee
scheme. First, cross-guarantees might discourage potentially efficient
mergers because, after the merger, the shareholders would be exposed
to greater downside risks if their bank remains profitable but is forced
Second, BHCs will
to pay for the bailout of a failed acquisition.'
find it more difficult to obtain capital because investment returns will
be reduced by the cost of bailouts. 32 Third, federal regulators will
find it harder to dispose of the assets of failed institutions because
BHCs will be less willing to purchase failed banks. 133 Fourth, the
cross-guarantee provisions, by virtue of express statutory language,
only allow the FDIC to recover when the subsidiary has either failed
or is already in need of assistance. 1"' Finally, the135FDIC may only
recover from other subsidiaries, not the BHC itself.
The cross-guarantee provisions may be viewed as complementary
to the Source-of-Strength doctrine, however, the Source-of-Strength
doctrine has never been formally enacted by Congress, which opted
Action" provisions of the FDIC
instead for the "Prompt Corrective
36
("FDICIA").1
Act
Improvement
2. The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991
One of the regulatory repercussions of the MCorp decision was
the addition of the "Prompt Corrective Action" provisions of the
FDICIA. 137 Section 131(e) of the Act provides that undercapitalized13 1 institutions will be monitored, and in addition, must submit
129. l
130. Id
131. See id at 59.
132. See id However, Keeton suggests that these decreased returns might be mitigated by
linking a bank's insurance premiums and capital requirements to its degree of geographic
diversification. Id
133. Id Keeton observes that the disincentive to engage in "Whole-Bank" transactions is
unfortunate because certain benefits are derived from these transactions, such as maintenance
of the failed bank as a going concern and positive customer relations. Id However, this
problem could be easily mitigated by waiving cross-guarantees for these transactions. Id
134. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(ce)(1)(A); Groth, supra note 20, at 133.
135. Groth, supra note 20, at 134. However, this factor may be insignificant if the
majority of the organization's capital is held at the subsidiary level.
136. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o.
137. Id; see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 1379.
138. The FDIC Improvement Act defines "undercapitalized" as "[a failure] to meet the
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restoration plan to the appropriate federal banking agena capital
9
cy. 139

An acceptable capital restoration plan would:
i) specify(I) the steps the insured depository institution will take to
become adequately capitalized;
(I) the levels of capital to be attained during each year in
which the plan will be in effect;
(i) how the institution will comply with the restrictions or requirements then in effect... and
(IV) the types and levels of activities in which the institution

will engage; and
(ii) contain such other information as the appropriate Federal banking agency may require. 40
The FRB would accept a plan that (1) complies with section
131(e)(2)(B), (2) is based on realistic assumptions and is likely to
succeed, and (3) would not increase the institution's exposure to risk.
Also, the controlling institution must guarantee compliance with the
four calenplan until full capitalization has been achieved for at least1 41
dar quarters, and must provide assurances of performance.
Section 131 appears to be, and has been stated to be, tantamount
to the current Source-of-Strength doctrine." Nevertheless, Congress
appears to have rejected the FRB's version of the doctrine insofar as
BHC liability is limited to the lesser of five percent of the
subsidiary's total assets at the time the subsidiary became undercapitalized, and the amount which would bring the subsidiary into compliance with the FRB's capital requirements. Clearly, section 131 does
not subject the BHC to potentially unlimited liability as is possible
under the Source-of-Strength doctrine.14 1 These requirements are superior to Source-of-Strength capital requirements because not only are
they more concrete, but the presence of set limits prevents regulators
from demanding capital infusions which may be either financially

required minimum level for any relevant capital measure." 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(C).
139. IdL § 1831o(e). This section calls for close regulatory monitoring of institutional
condition, compliance with capital restoration plans, restrictions or requirements imposed, and
periodic review of the plan, restrictions and requirements.
140. Id. § 1831o(e)(2)(B).
141. Id § 1831o(e)(2)(C).
142. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1379 (noting that "Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady

correctly noted that this provision is tantamount to the Board's source-of-strength doctrine").
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(E); Fallon, supra note 2, at 1379.
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futile or not feasible for the BHC. Also, the FDICIA's requirements
are unlikely to require a capital transfer which would be viewed as
corporate waste by shareholders.
C. Non-Statutory Issues
1. The Necessity of Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation
In general, business organizations adopt the corporate form primarily to limit investor liability. 44 Likewise, holding corporations
will maintain corporate separation from their subsidiaries for the same
reasons. 145 Regardless of the organization's structure, courts will
generally recognize the corporate form in the absence of certain conditions.'" These principles are no less important in the banking industry. 47 Thus, doctrines such as Source-of-Strength, which are implemented notwithstanding corporate separateness and the requirements
for disregard of corporateness, do violence to these concepts and
erode their usefulness in the banking context
The special character of the banking industry provides at least
four overarching motives to promote corporate separateness in BHC
governance and regulation. Use of agency-contrived methods of disregard for corporate separateness, such as the Source-of-Strength doctrine, threaten the sanctity of this principle.
First, corporate separateness minimizes the likelihood that bank
deposits would be used in ways that would increase the overall risk
exposure of the banking subsidiary.' For example, a BHC may be
144. See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 130 (3d ed. 1983).

145. See idL at 354-56 (discussing corporate separateness among parent and subsidiary

corporations).
146. Id at 355-56. Henn & Alexander posit that the corporate form will be recognized
"absent illegitimate purposes" unless: (1) transactions, employees or assets of the entities are
commingled; (2) the entities are not treated as separate entities through observance of separate
corporate formalities; (3) the entities are undercapitalized; (4) the entities are not held out to
the public as separate entities; and (5) the policies of one of the affiliated entities is directed

towards the interests of the other entity rather than its own. See id.
147. See generally Samuel Chase & Donn L. Waage, Corporate Separateness as a Tool
of Bank Regulation, reprinted in Competitive Equity in the Financial Services Industry:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,

98th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1984) (discussing the necessity of corporate separateness in BHC
governance and regulation). But see Anthony Cornyn et al., An Analysis of the Concept of
Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation from an Economic Perspective, reprinted in
Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 468 (1986) (arguing that most constituencies view BHCs as unified entities).
148.

ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 145-46 (1987).
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tempted to use its banking subsidiary's funds to rescue a failing nonbanking subsidiary. This goal of separateness directly conflicts with
the Source-of-Strength doctrine which directs that such a scenario
occur even though the relevant entities are legally independent.
Second, separateness prevents banking subsidiaries from using
federally insured deposits, obtained at below-market rates, to fund its
non-bank activities." 9
Third, separateness aids in the independent regulation of each of
the BHCs' entities. Several of the BHC's subsidiaries may be subject
to separate reviewing authorities, such as state banking or insurance
regulators. Corporate separateness allows each regulatory agency to
evaluate the relevant subsidiary without overlapping with another
agency's responsibilities."s° Professor Clark states that this motive is
the most important component in the argument for corporate separateness because risk assessment becomes much easier when each entity
is considered separately."' Otherwise, industry regulators would not
only have to evaluate the risk of the individual entity, but would also
that risk contributes to and is influenced by
have to determine how
1 52
the other subsidiaries.

Finally, BHCs have the incentive to form separate entities in
order to. decrease overall risk3 Black, Miller, and Posner argue
that risk may be decreased through diversification into both permissible non-banking fields as well as geographic diversification (where
possible).' 4
These motives assume that an assumption of independence is
made.155 This assumption posits that in addition to the aforementioned forbearance from inter-subsidiary fund transfers and independent risk evaluation, the capital market views the subsidiaries as inde-

149. Id. at 146.
150. Id.
151. Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 787, 815 (1987).
152. Id.
153. See Fischer Black et al., An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Compades, 51 J. Bus. 379, 393 (1978). But see Keeton, supra note 11 (discussing increased risk
resulting from BHC diversification).
154. Black et al., supra note 153, at 393. Black, Miller, and Posner also argue that BHC
risk may be increased in instances such as runs on subsidiary banks following a non-banking
subsidiary's failure, or where bank deposits are used bail out a non-banking subsidiary. Id. at
394.
155. See MICHAEL A. JESSEE & STEVEN A. SEE IO, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND
THE PuBLic INTEREsT 79 (1977).
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pendenLt"
Competing with this view is the dependence assumption."3 7 This assumption posits that in addition to engaging in intersubsidiary fund transfers, corporate insiders, depositors, and the capital
markets view the BHC and its subsidiaries as an interdependent
whole. It is the dependence assumption that lends undue credence to
the perceived efficacy of the Source-of-Strength doctrine. 158
Provided that BHCs encourage a policy of formal separateness,
outside constituencies should likewise evaluate the BHC and its subsidiaries as separate entities. Professor Clark argues that the problem
of unnecessary runs on healthy subsidiary banks after a non-banking
subsidiary fails could be mitigated simply by operating the subsidiaries under different names.'59 Coextensively, sophisticated lenders
will recognize the legal and practical distinctions between the BHC
and its subsidiaries and will structure their lending policies with less
regard to covariant risks."6° In fact, one commentator argues that if
banking regulators adopt a clearer policy stance on this issue, it
would further reassure these constituencies. Concomitantly, while
courts are unlikely to disregard the corporate form, they are especially
unlikely to do so in the banking context. 6 Moreover, stronger regulation on intercompany transactions, dividend policy, and capital adequacy would achieve the same results. 62
An implicit fear in the Source-of-Strength doctrine is that a BHC

156. Id. The competing view argues that an assumption of dependence should be made.
This view posits that the capital market sees the BHC and its subsidiaries as an integrated
whole and assumes that risks to one subsidiary are borne by all the subsidiaries.
157. Id at 78.
158. See Chase & Waage, supra note 147, at 268 (observing that the FRB, while
acknowledging the separate nature of BHCs from their banking subsidiaries, still keeps their
.consolidated nature" in mind); Comyn et al., supra note 147, at 476-77 (noting that banking
regulators view BHCs as integrated entities).
159. Clark, supra note 151, at 838. Full disclosure should, of course, be provided.
Nonetheless, operating subsidiaries under names other than that of the BHC or another wellknown name deprives the organization of a certain amount of "brand equity." See generally
PHILIP KonraR, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING, IiPLEMENTATION, &
CONTROL 441-49 (7th ed. 1991) (discussing brand decisions from a marketing perspective).
160. See Chase & Waage, supra note 147, at 268. Rating agencies will often rate BHC
long-term debt differently than subsidiary debt. Id But see Cornyn et al., supra note 147, at
472-76 (discussing public and market participants' view of BHCs).
161. Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating
the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 661 (1985); see also
MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 112 S. CL 459 (1991) (holding that the Source-of-Strength doctrine was beyond the
FRB's statutory authority).
162. See Chase & Waage, supra note 147, at 264-66; Clark, supra note 151, at 836-48.
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will simply allow a banking subsidiary to fail, using the doctrine of
corporate separateness as a shield. However, notwithstanding the
separate nature of the BHC and its subsidiaries, it is unlikely that a
BHC would allow a subsidiary to fail where it would be economically feasible for it to survive. 6 3 However, in some situations, it is
economically feasible for any firm to shut down a losing subsidiary.t64 The government should not interfere with so fundamental a
decision by imposing mandatory recapitalization requirements. Moreover, the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee has criticized the
Source-of-Strength doctrine inter alia as an improper bank closure
policy, interfering with165rational liquidation decisions and encouraging
inefficient investment.
Absent the presence of one of the traditional conditions for disregarding the corporate form, the Source-of-Strength doctrine contradicts
the fundamental principle of corporate separateness. In doing so, the
doctrine not only interferes with investors' rational expectations, but
also injects a certain level of uncertainty into transactions with BHCs
and encourages inefficient investment.
2. Improved Regulatory Oversight as an Alternative
The MCorp bailout reveals a fundamental weakness in the entire
federal regulatory scheme-agency inaction. Perhaps, early intervention, rather than post-insolvency capital infusions, would be a more
prudent strategy. Clearly, even the early intervention provisions of the
FDICIA will not be of any use if they are not utilized.
The MCorp study points out that as early as 1982, the OCC
noted "significant financial and operational problems."" 6 As time
progressed, the situation grew worse, and little affirmative action was
taken. Between 1982 and 1988, regulators only pursued informal

163. See, e.g., Chase & Waage, supra note 147, at 262-63 (providing examples of
situations where parent corporations aided subsidiaries partly from "managerial pride" and
partly from "good business judgment").
164. See BAUMOL & BLiNDER, supra note 116, at 474 (noting that while a firmn may
operate at a certain level of loss, failure to cover average variable costs necessitates a
decision to shut down operations).
165. See SFRC Statement, supra note 5. The statement further criticizes the Source-ofStrength doctrine for its vagueness of scope, itsdiscriminatory impact on BHCs, and the
FRB's questionable authority to impose such a policy. See also Fed May Lack Authority,
supra note 5 (discussing the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee's statement).
166. MCORP STUDY, supra note 16, at 8. The OCC observed that aside from MCorp's
overaggressive expansion scheme and lax loan review procedures, dividends continued to
increase and subsidiaries failed to properly deal with problem loans. Id at 9-10.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss1/6

24

Brown: Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.: Evaluating the Sourc
1992]

SOURCE-OF-STRENGTH DOCTRINE

methods, which were largely ignored.' 67 By the time the FRB issued its cease and desist order containing the Source-of-Strength capital directives, MCorp was already unable to survive without federal
assistance. The resulting bailout cost American taxpayers $2.7 billion.
The House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance recommended that a combination of stronger
enforcement, early intervention, and prevention of preferential loan
programs would prevent further failures on the scale of MCorp.'
Thus, requiring federal regulators.to take a more active role in BHC
oversight might prevent situations where capital infusions are necessary, thus decreasing the importance of the Source-of-Strength doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The Source-of-Strength doctrine is not without its usefulness. In
evaluating applications for BHC formation and expansion, there is
clear utility in the Source-of-Strength analysis. However, the FRB's
attempts to expand .the doctrine through nebulous promulgations and
without proper regulatory guidelines make the doctrine unpredictable,
and thus subject to non-uniform enforcement and litigation.
The implementation of FIRREA's Cross-Bank Guarantees and
FDICIA's Prompt Corrective Action provisions provide banking regu-

167. See idL at 10-16. The OCC and MCorp entered into several informal agreements, yet
MCorp ignored these and continued to raise dividends and accumulate risky assets.
168. See generally MCORP STUDY, supra note 16 at 21-30 (discussing recommendations).
The MCorp case was not the first instance where a major bank failure revealed regulatory
inadequacy. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., lST SESs., THE BANK OF NEW ENGLAND FAILURE AND
RESOLUTION 161-89 (Comm. Print 1991) (discussing the failure of both the Comptroller and
the FRB to effectively supervise the Bank of New England); STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE

OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
BANKING INDUSTRY IN TURMOIL: A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE U.S. BANKING

INDUSTRY AND THE BANK INSURANCE FUND 133 (Comm. Print 1990) (stating that the most
attractive option for controlling deposit insurance costs was "a more automatic system of
regulatory intervention, ideally supplemented with market-like devices to impel regulators to
act in a timely fashion to prevent weak banks from taking more risks"); STAFF OF HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION,

REGULATION AND

INSURANCE OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 99TH- CONG., 1ST
SESS., CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO ITS FEDERAL
SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE 87 (Comm. Print 1985) (noting that "[a] review of every

major bank failure indicates that the signs of later problems were clear many years earlier
and a pattern of agency acceptance is apparent. In some instances such as Continental, even
the specific nature of the later problems were identified years before the actual failure.").
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lators with congressionally-sanctioned tools which all but duplicate the
Source-of-Strength doctrine, albeit in a more certain form.
Further, the doctrine does violence to the concept of corporate
separateness. Assuming that most BHC managers are both competent
and rational actors, the recapitalization decision will consider economic efficiency and business realities. If it is economically feasible to
maintain the subsidiary as a going concern, it will be recapitalized. If
not, it will be closed. The Source-of-Strength doctrine disregards
ordinary business judgment in this context, possibly to the financial
detriment of the entire BHC.
Finally, Congressional reports of at least three major bank failures indicate that regulators either missed tell-tale signs of impending
insolvency altogether, or were unable to effect a managerial response.
Thus, it appears that adequate tools are present. However, to prevent
more MCorps, these tools must be used when and where they were
intended.
Craig L Brown*
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encouragement and editorial support.
for

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss1/6

26

